Cymie R. Payne writing for The American Society of International Law (ASIL Insight, Volume 14, Issue 9) revealed that the International Court of Justice had “recognized environmental impact assessment as a practice that has become an obligation of general international law”.

The insight goes on to state-

“On April 20, 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced its judgment in a high-stakes environmental dispute between Argentina and Uruguay, concerning Uruguay’s authorization for pulp mills on the banks of the Uruguay River, which forms the international boundary between the two countries. Over strenuous objections from Argentina, Uruguay authorized construction of one of the largest pulp mills in the world in 2005, which has been converting wood chips into paper pulp on the banks of the River since November 2007.[1]

The Court ruled that Uruguay was obligated by treaty to notify and consult with Argentina before authorizing the pulp mills and letting construction start; and that Uruguay breached this obligation.[2] However, the Court found that its declaration of Uruguay’s breach was in itself a sufficient remedy for Argentina’s claim.

The Court also examined Argentina’s claim that Uruguay breached substantive treaty obligations to coordinate with Argentina through a bilateral river management agency, and to monitor and prevent pollution of the water and riverbed. The Court scrutinized factual evidence from both sides in detail, and found no breach had occurred. The Court rejected all other claims in light of these two decisions.

This judgment is a significant step forward in the ICJ’s jurisprudence on environmental law and on shared watercourses. The Court recognized environmental impact assessment as a practice that has become an obligation of general international law in these situations. It further found that general international law does not prescribe the scope or content of such assessments. The Court has also fleshed out the definitions of “sustainable development” and “equitable and reasonable use” of shared transboundary watercourses by interpreting those terms in light of the facts of this case. For the most part, the decision relies on the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay (1975 Statute),[3] which was the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court does not interpret other multilateral environmental agreements, despite an effort by Argentina to bring them in. This Insight highlights some points of particular interest in the judgment of the Court and discusses the multiple advocacy strategies used by both parties. “

For more on this ICJ decision go to (ASIL Insight, Volume 14, Issue 9)